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SUICIDE PACT:
NEW READINGS OF THE SECOND
AMENDMENT
Michael A. Bellesiles*
"The choice is not between order and liberty. It is between
liberty with order and anarchy without either. There is danger
that, if the Court does not temper its doctrinaire logic with a
little practical wisdom, it will convert the constitutional Bill of
Rights into a suicide pact."
1
Justice Robert H. Jackson

There are many ways of reading the past. The most common and popular is a focus on the subject itself, a narrative of
the events with a little analysis mixed in. A second is the scholarly discourse, the author entering into a conversation with his
or her predecessors in the profession. And then there is the personal search by the individual author for meaning in the past, a
format favored by those interested in identity history and politics, and, all too often, by iegal scholars. This third tack is using
history in the service of some current position; what Bernard
Bailyn called "the twin sins of anachronism and presentism." 2
The first two approaches pursue "history" as a professional responsibility, the third as a policy struggle with only one possibly
correct position.
Laura Kalman's recent book, The Strange Career of Legal
Liberalism,3 offers an outstanding dissection of this division in
scholarly approaches. Legal scholars, she quotes Frank Michelman as stating, "min[e]" the past and "make a case" for a specific, pre-exiting perspective. Such writers ransack the past,
• Professor of History, Emory University.
1. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 US 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
2. Quoted in Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, A Book of Laugluer and Forgetting: Kalman's "Strange Career" and the Marketing of Civic Republicanism, 111 Harv. L Rev.
1025, 1027 (1998).
3. Laura Kalman, The Strange Career of Legal Liberalism (Yale U. Press, 1996).
4. ld. at 175.
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seeking supportive arguments and quotations to promote and
enhance their case for the present. Like big game hunters they
return from their safari with their prized quotes, having paid no
attention to the wider environment or social context of their trophies. They rarely descend into a period to get a sense of the
nuances and complexities; and they certainly never bother to
count, to arrive at the aggregate rather than the exceptional. As
Morton Horwitz put it, this "lawyer's history ... involves roaming through history looking for one's friends." 5
Good historians do not attempt to use the past to craft a
correct formula for current conduct (a classic misreading of
George Santayana). They do not seek a pedigree, as Kalman
put it. 6 Lawyers, who "appropriated historians for advocacy
purposes,"7 have not hesitated to seize upon republicanism, the
supposed ideology of the nation's founding, as a useful paradigm
with an imagined applicability to present circumstances. But the
present does not exist to provide precedent for some future society. It seems so obvious, yet somehow still needs stating whenever lawyers write legal history.
There are of course many notable exceptions. Andrew
Kull's Color Blind Constitution8 leaps to mind as a work of solid
historical scholarship which follows the evidence wherever it
may lead, and which is authentically concerned to get the context of legal developments just right. Nonetheless, far too many
legal scholars, most especially on issues revolving around the
Second Amendment, seem not to understand why one would
bother but to argue some imagined client's cause; nor can they
conceive what possible use history is if it does not provide usable
authority. A historian like William Leuchtenburg who finds and
uses evidence contrary to an initially held position may be incomprehensible to many legal scholars.9 "Leuchtenburg's compliment is the lawyer's insult," Kalman writes. "It is [the] lawyers' business to build paradigms. Too much orderliness,
however, makes historians suspicious. " 10 As Edmund Morgan
wrote Felix Frankfurter, the historian rejects "the demand for
5. Id. at 179 (quoting Morton Horwitz, Republican Origins of Constitutionalism, in
Paul Finkleman and Stephen Gottlieb, eds., Toward a Usable Past: Liberty Under State
Constitutions 148 (U. of Georgia Press, 1991)).
6. Kalman, Strange Career at 180 (cited in note 3).
7. Id. at 185.
8. Andrew Kull, The Color Blind Constitution (Harvard U. Press, 1992).
9. William E. Leuchtenburg, The Historian in the Public Realm, 97 Am. Hist. Rev.
11 (1992)
10. Kalman, Strange Career at 186 (cited in note 3).
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symmetry," avoiding sharp dichotomies which misrepresent the
past. 11 Put another way, professional historians immediately
doubt any case for which all the evidence falls consistently on
one side.
Historians know that history is full of ambiguities and paradoxes, and expect to find them. That explains why most historians of early America shrugged their shoulders in bemusement
over the Second Amendment debates and said little, until recently. Only when one side in that polemic proclaimed itself the
winner, and even went so far as to declare itself "the new consensus" and "the standard model," 12 did many historians come
13
forth to question this monopoly on truth.
Kalman notes that lawyers turned to republicanism as a total and all-inclusive explanation of early American history at
precisely the moment that American historians were abandoning
the concept. 14 Similarly, as Saul Cornell points out with great
acuity, proponents of an insurrectionist reading of the Second
Amendment have insisted that they have a "standard model" for
reading the Constitution and early American intellectual and
cultural life at the same time that the vast majority of historians
have rejected the idea that any aspect of American history can
be understood "in terms of a single ideological paradigm." 15
11. ld.
12. Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second Amendment, 62 Tenn.
L. Rev. 461 (1995). This issue of the Tennessee Law Review offers a complete, unquali·
fied, and uncritical overview of the "standard model," or "individualist" reading of the
Second Amendment. For claims that there is a "new consensus" and "virtual unanimity,
that there is no tenable textual or historical argument against a broad individual right
view of the Second Amendment," see Randy E. Barnett and Don B. Kates, Under Fire:
The New Consensus on the Second Amendmem, 45 Emory L.J. 1139, 1141 (1996).
13. Recent works examining the historical context include Lawrence D. Cress, An
Armed Community: The Origins and Meaning of the Right to Bear Arms, 71 J. of Am.
Hist. 22 (1984) (examines the intellectual context of the Second Amendment); Carl T.
Bogus, The Hidden History of the Second Amendment, 31 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 311 (1998)
(looks at fears of slave insurrection among the Southern elite); Don Higginbotham, The
Federalized Militia Debate: A Neglected Aspect of Second Amendment Scholarship, 55
Wm. & Mary Q. 39 (1998) (studies the first federal efforts to establish a "well regulated
militia"); as well as two articles I have written looking at patterns of gun ownership and
the nature of gun laws in early America: The Origins of American Gun Culture in the
United States, 1760-1865,83 J. of Am. Hist. 425 (1996); Gun Laws in Early America: The
Regulation of Firearms Ownership, 1607-1794, 16 L. & Hist. Rev. 567 (1998). The two
leading historical works for the Standard Modelers are Joyce Lee Malcolm, To Keep and
Bear Arms: The Origins of an Anglo-American Right (Harvard U. Press, 1994) and Robert E. Shalhope, The Ideological Origins of the Second Amendment, 69 J. of Am. Hist.
599 (1982).
14. Kalman, Strange Career at 176-80 (cited in note 3).
15. Saul Cornell, Commonplace or Anachronism: The Standard Model, The Second
Amendment, and the Problem of History in Contemporary Constitutional Theory, 16
Const. Comm. 221 (1999).
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Almost no historian speaks any more of a uniform, cohesive
American culture; there are too many strands to the fabric of
early American society to maintain that just one speaks for all.
But then that was exactly the point of federalism, and precisely
the perspective offered by James Madison in the Federalist Papers.16 So we now have the delicious irony of conservative legal
scholars rejecting the vision of James Madison as inaccurate, and
embracing the classic liberal ideal of a unifying American consensus.17
Adherents of the Standard Model find in the Second
Amendment a right to insurrection. The people retain the individual right to bear arms as an implicit threat to revolution. In
good times, that threat keeps the government in line; in bad,
when the government oversteps its bounds, the people may rise
up and overthrow that government. The position was most
clearly stated in the context of the recent bombing of the Murrah
Federal Building in Oklahoma, when Linda Thompson, declaring herself the Adjutant General of the Unorganized Militia of
the United States, explained that the Second Amendment "isn't
about hunting ducks; it's about hunting politicians. " 18 The most
obvious question which adherents of the Standard Model must
answer is: who gets to decide? Who chooses when it is time for
"the people" to use their arms against the government? Does
Linda Thompson get to choose? Timothy McVeigh?
The very questions point up the weakness of the position;
the Standard Model is an abstraction divorced from a specific
historical context. At times it borders on an intellectual game
played by law professors swapping quotations and citing one another. As one reads yet again Justice Story's description of the
militia as the "palladium of liberty," one realizes that the Standard Modellers are just shuffling the same deck and dealing it
out in a different order.
Let us stop for a moment and examine that now famous
quotation of Justice Story's, the only ante-bellum evidence for
16. To state the obvious, Federalist 10 (Madison) in Ointon Rossiter, ed., The Federalist Papers 77 (Mentor, 1961); but see Federalist 6 (Hamilton), id. at 53; Federalist 9
(Hamilton), id. at 71; Federalist 15 (Hamilton), id. at 105; Federalist 70 (Hamilton), id. at
423; Federalist 39 (Madison), id. at 240; Federalist 51 (Madison), id. at 320. See also Jack
N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution 161202 (Alfred A. Knopf, 1996).
17. Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American
Political Thought Since the Revolution (Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1955).
18. David C. Williams, The Militia Movement and Second Amendment Revolution:
Conjuring with the People, 81 Cornell L. Rev. 879,894 (1996).
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the supposed right to insurrection imbedded in the Second
Amendment offered by Sanford Levinson in his landmark arti19
cle, The Embarrassing Second Amendment.
For those of you
who have somehow managed to miss it, Joseph Story wrote in
his Commentaries:
The right of the citizens to keep and bear arms has justly been
considered as the palladium of the liberties of a republic, since
it offers a strong moral check against the usurpation and arbitrary power of rulers, and will generally, even if these are successful in the first instance, enable the people to resist and trizo
umph over them.

No one claims that this single quotation proves an individual right to bear arms, most particularly because Justice Story
was not present at the creation and also frames his discussion of
the Second Amendment in terms of the militia, and because the
next two sentences, rarely quoted, seemingly deny such an individual right. 21 Yet it is a foundational citation for the Standard
Modelers, standing in for the absence of any direct evidence
from the framers themselves. For an historian the core question
is how reflective this single sentence is of the thought of Joseph
Story. The militia appears a minor issue in Story's life; in fact
there is no reference to it in the collection of his work he prepared,22 nor in that prepared by his son, 23 nor in his collected letters,24 nor in any of the standard biographies of Story. 25
19. Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 Yale L.J. 637,
649-50 (1989). Levinson also cited Thomas Cooley, The General Principles of Constitutional Law in the United States of America 298 (Little, Brown, 3d ed. 1898), and the early
twentieth century lawyer, Theodore Schroeder, Free Speech for Radicals 104 (Burt
Franklin, 1969).
20. Joseph Story, 2 Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States: With a
Preliminary Review of the Constitutional History of the Colonies and States Before the
Adoption of the Constitution 620 (Little, Brown, and Co., 1873).
21. "And yet, though this truth would seem so clear, and the importance of a wellregulated militia would seem so undeniable, it cannot be disguised that, among the
American people, there is a growing indifference to any system of militia discipline, and a
strong disposition, from a sense of its burdens, to be rid of all regulations. How it is practicable to keep the people duly armed without some organization it is difficult to see."
ld at 620-21.
22. Joseph Story, The Miscellaneous Writings, Literary, Critical, Juridical, and Political (James Munroe and Co., 1835).
23. William W. Story, ed., The Miscellaneous Writings of Joseph Story (Charles C.
Little and James Brown, 1852).
24. William W. Story, ed., Life and Leuers of Joseph Story (Charles C. Little and
James Brown, 1851).
25. R. Kent Newmyer, Supreme Coun Justice Joseph Story: Statesman of the Old
Republic (U. of North Carolina Press, 1985); Gerald T. Dunne, Justice Joseph Story and
the Rise of the Supreme Court (Simon and Schuster, 1970); James McClellan, Joseph
Story and the American Constitution: A Study in Political and Legal Thought (U. of
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Story, who never served in the militia, did, however, have an
opinion about the right to insurrection: he denied it, actively opposing any which occurred in his lifetime. Justice Story is seen
by most commentators as a conservative figure. 26 He considered
himself a disciple of Burke and held up Metternich as a role
model to his students. 27 He warned these same Harvard students
against the abolitionists-anarchists bent on overturning the
constitutional order-and viewed with horror the contemporary
"restless spirit of innovation and change-a fretful desire to provoke discussions of all sorts, under the pretext of free inquiry, or
of comprehensive liberalism. "28 Story proclaimed Dorr's nonviolent rebellion to establish universal manhood suffrage "without law and against law," 29 maintained that "the Legislature have
a right to call upon the President to protect the government
against 'domestic violence,' under the Constitution of the United
States," 30 and requested President Tyler to warn "all persons not
to attempt to carry any measures into effect by military power,
or by insurrectionary movements. "31 Story proclaimed insurrection treason, clarifying that treason included any action "to prevent the execution of any one or more general and public laws of
the government, or to resist the exercise of any legitimate
authority. "32
In short, Story held the opposite of what the Standard Modelers read into a single quotation. Faced with insurrection, Story
wrote "I know no duty more sacred in every citizen than upon
such an emergency to come forth and resist by all the just and
moral means in his power, such proceedings."33 For Story the
American Revolution put an end to the need for any more reOklahoma Press, 1971).
26. The entire thrust of McOellan, Joseph Story (cited in note 25). See also Newmyer, Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story at 84-88, 94-97, 155-81, 269-70, 313, 390-91
(cited in note 25).
27. Story, ed., Miscellaneous Writings at 761, 777 (cited in note 23); Newmyer, Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story at 356 (cited in note 25); Dunne, Justice Joseph Story at
338 (cited in note 25); McOellan, Joseph Story at 79-81 (cited in note 25).
28. Story, ed., Miscellaneous Writings at 747 (cited in note 23); Newmyer, Supreme
Coun Justice Joseph Story at 357 (cited in note 25).
29. Newmyer, Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story at 360 (cited in note 25) (quoting
Letter from Story to Webster, April 26, 1842, Webster Papers (New Hampshire Historical
Society)).
30. Letter from Story to Judge Pitman (April1, 1842), in Story, ed., 2 Life and Letters at 419 (cited in note 24).
31. Newmyer, Supreme Coun Justice Joseph Story at 361 (cited in note 25) (quoting
Letter from Story to Daniel Webster).
32. Id at 362; Story, ed., 2 Life and Letters at 516 (cited in note 24).
33. Letter from Story to Judge Pitman (Feb. 10, 1842), in Story, ed., 2 life and Letters at 416 (cited in note 24).
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hellions or uprisings; the country was now stable and secure, and
the people should remain orderly. To read the sources otherwise is to practice a twisted form of post-modernism. Or as Justice Story also wrote, "It is astonishing how easily men satisfy
themselves that the Constitution is exactly what they wish it to
be."34
But there is more to history than parsing the language of the
Second Amendment and a few shared quotations. As I hope I
demonstrated above, and as Saul Cornell compellingly insists,
for historians of any subject it is vital that "the behavior of the
historical actors who wrote these texts must be read alongside
their published statements. "35 It matters at least as much what
those who framed and endorsed the Second Amendment actually did; to examine what legislation preceded and followed the
Bill of Rights in order to understand how the framers intended
to use it; to trace their patterns of enforcement once in office. It
matters that every state in the union had gun regulations in place
at the time of the Second Amendment's passage, and that more
followed afterward. 36 It matters that those who passed federal
militia regulation over the next several decades saw themselves
responding to constitutional mandate. 37 It also mattered, as I
think Cornell's article makes clear, that those who supported the
Second Amendment had no problem disarming rebels and using
the power of the state and federal governments to put down any
and all insurrections.
Cornell correctly draws our attention to the example of
Pennsylvania. The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 provides
another key quotation for the Standard Modelers, as Cornell
notes: "The people have a ri§ht to bear arms for the defense [of]
themselves and the State." 8 Yet that provision apparently
granting an individual right to bear arms did not preclude the
same legislature from passing the Test Act, which included the
disarming of those who would not take the oath of allegiance.
34. Letter from Story to Simon Greenleaf (Feb. 16, 1845), in Story, ed., 2 Life and
Letters at 514 (cited in note 24).
35. Cornell, Commonplace or Anachronism at 225 (cited in note 15).
36. Bellesiles, Gun Laws in Early America at 587 (cited in note 13).
37. Higginbotham, The Federalized Militia Debate (cited in note 13); Lyle D. Brundage, The Organization, Administration, and Training of the United States Ordinary and
Volunteer Militia, 1792-1861 (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1958); Martin
K. Gordon, The Militia of the District of Columbia, 1790-1815 (Ph.D. dissertation,
George Washington University, 1975); Mark Pitcavage, An Equitable Burden: The Decline of the State Militias (Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University, 1995).
38. Cornell, Commonplace or Anachronism at 228 (cited in note 15) (quoting Pennsylvania Convention, Declaration of Rights, August 21, 1776).
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That would seem evidence enough that this right was not truly
individual but carefully constrained by legal category. There was
nothing unusual in this formulation by Pennsylvania; the right to
possess firearms had always been subject to government regulation under British common law and colonial practice. Pennsylvania retained a long tradition of controlling dangerous populations, rejecting, as Cornell writes, "the very right to armed
resistance posited by the Standard Model." 39 The framers of the
United States Constitution drew upon the same legal heritage.
Of course it is a very strange conception of America's
founding document to believe that it included a right of armed
rejection by any group of individuals. The Framers knew what
horrors faced them if they could not establish social and political
order. Shays' Rebellion was an obvious indicator to them of the
direction of the country if they did not act quickly. George
Washington wrote to Madison that "We are fast verging to anarchy and confusion," finding the crisis in Massachusetts but a local variant of a national problem requiring a federal solution.40
Most of the new nation's would-be leaders found the Shaysites
dangerous levelers who could easily link up with other supporters of excessive democracy, unless, as Secretary of War Henry
Knox recommended, federal troops were sent against them.
Washington displayed more skepticism, attempting to learn if
the rebels had "real grievances" and why the government of
Massachusetts did not address these problems. But if the Shaysites lacked some substantive complaint against their government, then Washington agreed with Knox that the states must
move to defend their interests or witness the dissolution of government in the United States.41
Framed in the aftermath of Shays' Rebellion, the Constitution appears to many scholars as an essentially conservative reaction to the spread of democracy. 42 Such a reading seems to me
39. ld. at 229.
40. Letter from Washington to Madison (Nov. 5, 1786), in John C. Fitzpatrick, ed.,
29 The Writings of George Washington 29,51 (Government Printing Office, 1939).
41. ld. at 26-28 (Letter from Washington to David Humphreys, Oct. 22, 1786); id. at
33-35 (Letter from Washington to Henry Lee, Oct. 31, 1786); Letter from Knox to Congress, (Oct. 18, 1786), in John Fitzpatrick, ed., 31 Journals of the Continental Congress
887 (Government Printing Office, 1934); Letter from Knox to Washington {Oct. 23,
1786), Henry Knox Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society (Boston).
42. David P. Szatmary, Shays' Rebellion: The Making of an Agrarian Insurrection
127-34 (U. of Massachusetts Press, 1980); Stephen E. Patterson, The Federal Reaction to
Shays's Rebellion, in Robert A. Gross, ed., In Debt to Shays: The Bicentennial of an
Agrarian Rebellion 101-18 (U. Press of Virginia, 1993); Michael Lienesch, Reinterpreting
Rebellion: The Influence of Shays's Rebellion on American Political Thought, in Gross,
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anachronistic. The Framers' first concern was to create a country which would survive; that goal, in their eyes, required certain
limitations on personalliberty.43 Guns were to be used by those
serving in the militia, as state laws made evident, and the militia's duty was to maintain order. 44 Unlike during the American
Revolution, when the crowd was the militia, in the early national
45
period the crowd was repeatedly confronted by the militia.
Even Samuel Adams, one of America's leading democrats, rejected pardons for the Shaysites: "the man who dares to rebel
against the laws of a republic ought to die. "46 Not a lot of support for the right of insurrection there.
But what if the government acted in a tyrannical fashion?
Surely the people should rise up in rebellion then? Yet that was
the purpose of the Constitution, to prevent despotism. Similarly,
the central government, Madison hoped, would act as a check on
the excess power of the state governments, which he feared
more than a federal tyranny. 47 Revolution, as Cornell reminds us,
ed., In Debt to Shays at 161-82; Richard D. Brown, Shays's Rebellion and the Ratification
of the Federal Constitution in Massachusens, in Richard Beeman, et al., eds., Beyond
Confederation: Origins of the Constitution and American National Identity 113 (U. of
North Carolina Press, 1987).
43. Federalist 6 (Hamilton) at 53 (cited in note 16); Federalist 15 (Hamilton) at 105
(cited in note 16); Federalist 70 (Hamilton) at 423 (cited in note 16); Federalist 10 (Madison) at 77 (cited in note 16); Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24,
1787), in Robert A. Rutland, et al., eds., 10 The Papers of James Madison 212-14 (U. of
Chicago Press, 1977); Letter from Madison to Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in Robert A.
Rutland, et al., eds., 11 The Papers of James Madison 297-300 (U. Press of Virginia,
1977).
44. Oarence C. Ferguson, The Inherent Justiciability of the Constitutional Guaranty
Against Domestic Violence, 13 Rutgers L. Rev. 407 (1959).
45. On Colonial and revolutionary traditions of crowd action see Pauline Maier,
From Resistance to Revolution: Colonial Radicals and the Development of American Opposition to Britain, 1756-1776 (Alfred A. Knopf, 1972); Dirk Hoerder, Crowd Action in
Revolutionary Massachusens, 1765-1780 (Academic Press, 1977); Edward Countryman, A
People in Revolution: The American Revolution and Political Society in New York, 17601790 (Johns Hopkins U. Press, 1981); Michael A. Bellesiles, Revolutionary Outlaws:
Ethan Allen and the Struggle for Independence on the Early American Frontier (U. Press
of Virginia, 1993). On crowds in the constitutional period opposed by militia, see William Slade, ed., Vermont State Papers 475-82 (J.W. Copeland, 1823); Pennsylvania
Packet, and Daily Adveniser, Dec. 27, 1786; Vermont Journal, and the Universal Advertiser, Dec., 1783; Alan Taylor, Libeny Men and Great Proprietors: The Revolutionary
Senlement on the Maine Frontier, 1760-1820 (U. of North Carolina Press, 1990). On the
crowd in the early national period facing militia, see Paul A. Gilje, The Road to Mobocracy: Popular Disorder in New York City, 1763-1834 (U. of North Carolina Press,
1987), and David Grimsted, American Mobbing, 1828-1861: Toward Civil War (Oxford
U. Press, 1998).
46. John H. Lockwood, et al., eds., 1 Western Massachuseus: A History, 1636-1925
at 183 (Lewis Historical Publishing Co., 1926). George Washington wrote Benjamin Lincoln, Jr., that the insurgents "had by their repeated outrages forfeited all right to Citizenship." Fitzpatrick, ed., 29 Writings of Washington at 168 (cited in note 40).
47. Madison, Vices of the Political System of the U. States, in Marvin Meyers, ed.,
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is a natural right, a last resort when the Constitution itself has
been contravened; it is not itself a part of the Constitution.48
Such an extension of violent opposition to authority as a regular
component of government would have destabilized the nation
from the beginning and guaranteed its failure. Fortunately the
framers were smarter than that.
It is very possible that we now live in a nation of individualists intent on personal self-fulfillment unwilling to suffer any inconvenience, such as any sort of limitation on our right to purchase and possess firearms. But that does not mean it was
always this way. One of the few ideas which one can locate percolating among both the Federalists and Antifederalists is the
notion that liberty requires sacrifice, that the individual must be
willin§ to give up some convenience in the name of the common
good.
In terms of gun ownership, sacrificing a little liberty for the
public good meant allowing the government to conduct gun censuses (a continuation of the traditional assize of arms), a willingness to serve in the militia when called, placing one's own gun at
the service of the state in times of emergency, and, for some, the
denial of the right to bear arms. 50 It certainly did not mean that
the individual could get together with some other aggrieved
neighbors and defy the law. Though the federal and state governments rarely responded to such threats to social order with
violence during the first fifty years of the republic, they did call
out troops on a number of occasions when threatened with insurrection. And the insurgents rarely found friendly support
elsewhere in the country. Even the most sympathetic study of
the Whiskey Rebellion, that of Thomas Slaughter, cannot find
much support for their goals outside of western Pennsylvania.51
Even the most assiduous quotation hunter has yet to find a single line insisting that the rebels are just exercising their Second
Amendment rights.
The Mind of the Founder: Sources of the Political Thought of James Madison 59 (U. Press
of New England, 1981); Letter from Madison to Washington (April 16, 1787), id. at 6669; Federalist 8 (Hamilton), at 66 (cited in note 16); Federalist 32 (Hamilton), at 197
(cited in note 16); Federalist 43 (Madison), at 271 (cited in note 16); Federalist 45 (Madison), at 288 (cited in note 16); Federalist 46 (Madison), at 294 (cited in note 16); Rakove,
Original Meanings, at 34, 48-56, 334·36 (cited in note 16).
48. Cornell, Commonplace or Anachronism at 237-38 (cited in note 15).
49. Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787, at 19,396429 (U. of North Carolina Press, 1969).
SO. Bellesiles, Origins of American Gun Culture at 428-35 (cited in note 13).
51. Thomas P. Slaughter, The Whiskey Rebellion: Frontier Epilogue to the American
Revolution 190-204 (Oxford U. Press, 1986).
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In the long and meticulous debates over the Militia Act in
the first Congress, which considered even the exact bore of the
muskets to be required of the militia, the speakers return repeatedly to just how much authority the federal government
should have in exercising its constitutional obligation of regulating the militia. Several representatives noted that every increase in federal power came at the expense of the states. Thomas Fitzsimmons rejected the need for militia training as "a
great tax on the community, productive of little instruction or
edification, either in regard to military tactics, or the morals of a
civilized nation."52 Most members, however, agreed with Roger
Sherman of Connecticut that "the different states had certainly
an inherent right to arm and protect the lives and property of the
citizens." But that to "[m]ore effectively ... exercise this right"
the states needed "to give up to the general government the
power of fixing what arms the militia should use, by what discipline they should be regulated," and various other forms of precisely ordering the nature of the militia. The only power left to
the states in this formulation was "the right to say what descriptions of persons should compose the militia, and to appoint the
officers that were to command it."53 Joshua Seney of Maryland
thought even this latter qualification was granting the states too
much power, which they could easily abuse. 54
Perhaps the only way around these problems for the Standard Modelers, aside from conducting research, is to argue that
an individual right must be understood to apply solely to those
who enjoy all other rights. Thus the right to bear arms is individual in that the militia consists of all adult male citizens (by
definition white in most states), and so for them the right is individual. But what happens when those citizens are divided? That
was bound to happen often, as Madison perceived. The Constitution, as we all know, was an effort to form a stable government
between the dangers posed by the tyranny of the majority and
excess factionalism. There was no consensus, no unity of vision.
The Federalists were not in complete agreement; neither were
the Antifederalists-nothing like it. If each collection of citizens
was allowed to respond with arms in defense of their understanding of liberty, there would be no social peace.
Not that social peace was always a good thing. It is worth
52. William C. diGiacomantonio, et al., eds., 14 Documentary History of the First
Federal Congress 1789-1791 at 56 (Johns Hopkins U. Press, 1996).
53. ld. at 84.
54. ld. at 93-94.

258

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol.16:247

remembering that several state governments were despotic in
this period. Southern states viciously enforced a system of slavery, denying the most basic rights to millions of Americans.
They also trampled on the individual rights of whites, giving
postmasters the right to open mail searching for anti-slavery sentiment, forbidding the circulation of literature questioning slavery, outlawing public meetings of abolitionists, enforcing the
most unrelenting intellectual conformity ever experienced in
American history in gross violation of the Constitution. Did the
Southern militia rise up to battle this tyranny? Of course not;
they enforced it. 55 When the state of Georgia violated the rights
of the Cherokee people and forced them off their lands in direct
violation of the Supreme Court, did the militia of Georgia rush
out, muskets in hand, to protect the rights of their fellow Americans? Obviously not; they joined with the Army in expelling the
Cherokee from their property. When workers had their right of
assembly taken from them, where was the militia? When
women were jailed for attempting to exercise the right to vote,
where was the militia? One could go on and on. The reality of
American history is clear: the militia and its National Guard successor upholds the power of the state. The Standard Model operated only once in American history: in 1861.
Perhaps the most peculiar aspect of the whole gun control
debate is the way in which people who call themselves conservatives support a right to armed insurrection.56 Logically, those
who uphold this insurrectionist reading of the Second Amendment should be endorsing armed uprisings by workers, racial
minorities, Indians, the Klan, anarchists, and the whole goulash
of American political dissidents who believe in armed response
to political disagreement. 57 They certainly should be condemn55. On the government protecting itself against such threats, see Federalist 21
(Hamilton), at 138 (cited in note 16); Federalist 28 (Hamilton), at 178 (cited in note 16);
Federalist 74 (Hamilton), at 447 (cited in note 16); St. George Tucker, 1 Blackstone's
Commentaries: With Notes of Reference, to the Constitution and Laws, of the Federal
Government of the United States 366-67 (W.Y. Birch and A. Small, 1803); Story, 2 Com·
mentaries at 546-47, 559 (cited in note 20). That Madison in fact saw a threat from an
excess of democratic action is evidenced in a letter he wrote his father, in which he stated
that the Shaysites sought "an abolition of debts, public and private, and a new division of
property." Isaac Kramnick, ed., The Federalist Papers 28 (P. Smith, 1995).
56. See for instance, L.A. Powe, Jr., Guns, Words, and Constitutional Interpretation,
38 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1311 (1997); and the exchange between Dennis A. Henigan,
Arms, Anarchy and the Second Amendment, 26 Val. U. L. Rev. 107 (1991), and Stephen
P. Halbrook, The Right of the People or the Power of the State: Bearing Arms, Arming
Militias, and the Second Amendment, 26 Val. U. L. Rev. 131 (1991).
57. David Williams evades this problem by declaring that the Second Amendment
did indeed originally grant an insurrectionary right; but not now! Williams, The Militia
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ing the police powers of the state which have crushed every
armed insurrection from the Whiskey Rebellion through the
Civil War to the Rodney King riots. But honestly, that is not
what the "Standard Modelers" are arguing for. They are not
radicals taking to the streets and endorsing the people's right to
armed rebellion, whoever those people happen to be. They tend
to be political conservatives seeking to negate the government's
authority to regulate firearms. But these are conservatives who
offer a libertarian reading of society; rather than relying on the
state for personal protection, the individual must protect himself.
It is a view which accepts and fosters the atomistic nature of society and can conceive of no communal strategy for collective security. It is a view which would have baffled Madison, who
sought social cohesion in a society which all too easily could
fragment and collapse into chaos. And it is a perspective which
carries a heavy and violent price tag.
Recently, one of the leading voices in favor of the Standard
Model, Sanford Levinson, joined J. M. Balkin in calling for legal
scholars to get beyond "The Canons of Constitutional Law."58
They argue that a reliance on the same materials generation after generation has stultified legal education and negatively influences the character of scholarly arguments through what they
call "deep canonicity." 59 This deep canonicity determines the nature of "law-talk," the rhetoric of the law, as well as the issues
which are appropriate for examination and the way in which
they are studied; "those ideas so basic that th~ do not even appear on the 'radar screen' of the imagination."
But most intriguing is Levinson and Balkin's notion of "Canonical Narratives." These narratives are "a set of stock stories
about [the law], which are constantly retold and eventually take
on a mythic status."61 It is hard to imagine a better description of
the Standard Model's self-generation, especially the "canonical
examples," the evidence offered time and again in support of the
62
same positions. "These stories," Levinson and Balkin continue,
"explain to the members of that society who they are and what
values they hold most dear. These stock stories are both descripMovement and the Second Amendment Revolution at 948-52 (cited in note 18).
58. J.M. Balkin and Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111
Harv. L. Rev. 963 (1998).
59. ld. at 985.
60. ld. at 985. See also Pierre Schlag, Normativity and the Politics of Form, 139 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 801 (1991).
61. Levinson and Balkin, Canons of Constitutional Law at 9'if7 (cited in note 58).
62. ld. at 992.
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tive and prescriptive"- for example, the mythology of "courageous pioneers who won the West."63
This call for the expansion of the canon is essentially a demand for historical context. 64 It is interesting therefore to note
that Levinson offers a personal footnote that "there can be little
doubt that many members of the founding generation viewed
popular possession of arms as the ultimate 'check' on corrupt
governments."65 That sounds like deep canonicity to me, particularly as he supports this assertion by citing his own article,
The Embarrassing Second Amendment, which offers only three
quotations supportive of this right, none by a contemporary of
the first Congress.66 No doubt Levinson will enthusiastically welcome Saul Cornell's efforts in forging beyond the canon of the
Standard Model to construct the historical context of the Second
Amendment.
Sometimes one gets the impression that some of the participants in this polemic do not even bother to read beyond the quotations into the original sources. For instance, Standard Modelers trace the individual right to bear arms to Machiavel!'t's
republicanism.67 Yet reading Machiavelli makes fairly clear that,
to quote Wendy Brown, "Machiavelli's republican citizenry is
not armed against the state but as the state-an armed citizenry
is the state's heart, not its opposition or counterweight."68
Even more telling is the comment of Stephen Holbrook that
the framers of the Second Amendment intended "to guarantee
the right of the people to have 'their private arms' to prevent
63.

ld. at 987.
See particularly id. at 1021-24.
65. ld. at 1013 n.157.
66. Id. Levinson specifically cites pages 648-50 of The Embarrassing Second
Amendment, where Story, Cooley, and Schroeder are cited in support of this right to insurrection.
67. See, for instance, Malcolm, To Keep and Bear Arms at 8, 125 (cited in note 13).
Malcolm does not actually quote or cite Machiavelli when discussing his ideas and influence. She does however quote J.G.A. Pocock's judgment that "(t)he rigorous equation
of arms-bearing with civic capacity is one of Machiavelli's most enduring legacies to later
political thinkers." Id. at 8 (quoting J.G.A. Pocock, The Political Works of James Harrington 18-19 (Cambridge U. Press, 1977)). Curiously, she does not quote or comment
upon the immediately preceding sentences in which Pocock writes that Machiavelli insisted that "an armed people" acted to "extend( ] her (the city-state's] power abroad"
and were "subject to none but the public power." Id at 18.
68. Wendy Brown, Guns, Cowboys, Philadelphia Mayors, and Civic Republicanism:
On Sanford Levinson's The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 Yale L.J. 661,662-63
(1989). Among Niccolo Machiavelli's many writings on this point, see for instance The
Prince 231 (Bobbs-Merrill, 1976}; History of florence and of the Affairs of Italy: From the
Earliest Times to the Death of Lorenzo the Magnificent 180 (M.W. Dunne, 1901); Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius 410 (1965).
64.
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tyranny and to overpower an abusive standing army or select
militia."69 Yet consider the speech James Madison delivered
when he introduced that same Second Amendment to the House
of Representatives:
In our government it is, perhaps, less necessary to guard
against the abuse in the executive department than any other;
because it is not the stronger branch of the system, but the
weaker .... But I confess that I do conceive, that in a government modified like this of the United States, the great danger
lies rather in the abuse of the community than in the legislative body. The prescriptions in favor of liberty, ought to be
levelled against that quarter where the greatest danger lies,
namely, that which possesses the highest prerogative of
power: But this [is] not found in either the executive or legislative departments of government, but in the body of the peo70
ple, operating by the majority against the minority.

Madison hardly issued a clarion call for the people's right to insurrection. Perhaps we no longer agree with Madison's formulation. Perhaps we find it elitist or poor prophesy. The point is:
our opinion does not matter. This is still what Madison said.
That is history; the rest is editorial.

69. Stephen P. Halbrook, That Every Man be Armed: The Evolution of a Constitutional Right 77 (U. of New Mexico Press, 1984 ).
70. Jack N. Rakove, ed., Declaring Rights: A Brief History with Documents 176-77
(Bedford Books, 1998).

